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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY, a Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COl\IMISSION OF
UTAH, a body politic and UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action by Ogden City for itself and other
municipalities similarly situated to review and annul
an order of the Public Service Commission ordering that
the defendant Utah Power and Light Company

I

./

''Shall state on customer's hill and collect as
a separate item on a pro rata basis from its
customers in any municipality wherein is imposed any municipal franchise, occupation, sales
or license tax.''
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This order was entered upon the Commission's own
motion in a proceeding upon application by the Company
for Commission approval of proposed E~lectric Service
Rate Schedules, a proceeding designated by the Commission as its Case No. 3780. No question is raised as
to the validity of the other orders entered therein.
For the credit and honor of the Company it must
be said that it opposed the making of this order upon
the stated ground that compliance therewith would constitute a breach of faith with Ogden City and other
franchise granting cities, and would he a violation of
its franchise contracts. (R. 673-5 ).
The Commission's order presently affects existing
negotiated franchise contracts between the Company
and Ogden, Salt Lake City and Sandy, in which the
agreed rentals or fees are 2% of gross revenues from
power sold within the city limits, and a 1% business
licens.e tax levied by South Salt Lake on the business
of distributing or selling electricity. There are also
seven franchises with small cities, for which total annual
fees of $468.00 are paid. (R. 253).
This hrief will address itself to the problem presented in the case of Ogden City, hut it appears that the
controlling principales are equally applicable to the
problems of the other franchise cities. Moreover, all
of the arguments presented except those relating to the
status of the franchise agreements as contracts apply
with equal force to the situation of the South Salt Lake
business tax.
2
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On ~Iarrh 14. 1951, pursuant to pre,·ions negotiations with the Company (R. ~3~), Og·den City adopted
an Ordinanre granting to the l \)nlpan:· the right or
franchise to use the city streets for its power transmission lines for a period of 30 ~·pars from January 1, 1951.
(R. 229). Section 5 thereof provides that
•·As a further consideration for this franchise and in lieu of all municipal occupation or
license taxes upon the Company, its property or
business within the City, the Company agrees to
pay a sum equal to two percentum (2%) of the
gross revenue derived by the Company from the
sale and use of electrical power and energy within the corporate limits of the City.'' (R. 230--emphasis supplied.)
Section 7 thereof provides that
"Utah Power & Light Company within thirty
days after the effective date of this Ordinance
shall file its acceptance thereof in writing with
the City Recorder of Ogden, otherwise the same
shall be null and void.
(R. 230-emphasis
supplied.)
By Section 8 it was provided that upon such acceptance the franchises under which .the Company and its
predecessors had been using the City streets for more
than 40 years should be repealed. ( R. 230-231).
The Company accepted the offer and grant contained in the Ordinance and procured from the Com~
mission a certificate of Convenience and Necessity to
exercise the franchise so granted. (R. 232---4). The
contract was complete, and the parties began their operations thereunder.
3
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Then on March 26, 1952, the Company filed new rate
schedules for electric power to be furnished by it, with
an application for the Commission's approval thereof.
(R. 1-5; 98-158). TheApplication was heard by the
Commission in May and June, 1952. Previous to this
time the franchise fees had been ''absorbed'' as a general operating expense, paid out of the Company's
general operating revenues. (R. 510; 512; 514). The
Company proposed to continue this practice.
However, at the hearing the question of the handling of the municipal franchise fees and license taxes
was raised by Counsel for the Commission (R. 509, et
seq.) and the Commission Chairman indicated that the
Commission thought the public would be better informed
as to franchise taxes if the tax was billed separately
to the public and that such action would stop the levying
of municipal franchise taxes. (R. 676).
The Company, however, reported that it had, in
negotiating the franchises, represented to the franchise
cities, including Ogden, that the franchise fees would
not be imposed (or ''passed on'' to) the inhabitants of
the franchise cities, and that the Company had engaged
in an implied undertaking with the cities not to do so.
(R. 673-4). It objected to the proposal that it violate
this undertaking and charge back to the inhabitants the
moneys it was supposed to pay the city for their benefit.
G. M. Gadsby, for many years the President and
General Manager of the Company, was the only witness
examined as to the franchise fees and their bearing on
the company's rate structure.
4
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He testified in effect that in negotiating the franchise contracts it was the intention of the Company to
''absorb'' the franchise fees, and not to bill the customers
for the amount thereof. (R. 510-51-l- ).
He also testified that the net effect of the franchise
tax transactions 'nts too small to have really affected
the question of rates at all, and that had their earnings ·
been maintained as they were in 1950, the increase in
Franchise fees could haYe been absorbed by the Company without any rate increase. (R. 511). Obviously
other factors brought about the Company's request for
a rate incrtase.
The Company has what ~Ir. Gadsby referred to as
a "postage stamp" type of rate; that is it charges all
consumers everywhere exactly the same rate for the
same service. ( R. 526).
In the franchise granting cities there is a "greater
density of customers;'' there are relatively more customers per mile of line or $100.00 of investment.
(R. 526-7). The relative cost of serving the urban
customer is therefore lower.
As a result the ability of the Company to do business in Ogden and the other franchise cities is of benefit
to the customers over the whole system. If the Company
did not have the business in these larger communities,
it could not serve the other communities at the now prevailing rates. The larger communities make a positive
financial contribution to the rates charged aU customers.Mr. Gadsby testified under oath that although he could
not tell whether that contribution was equivalent to a 2%
or a 5%, it is something. (R. 527).
5
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There is no evidence to the contrary anywhere in
the record.
In other words, because the rates are the same, and
the cost and investment incident to serving the urban
customers are lower, the urban customers in the franchise cities are already "carrying on their backs" the
customers outside these urban areas-perhaps to an
even greater extent than the maximum 2% franchise
fees.
Moreover, as Mr. Gadsby pointed out, the great
business stability and security which results from long
term franchises makes the Company's bonds more attractive, so that they can be marketed at a lower rate of
interest, thus lowering expenses to the ultimate benefit
of the ratepayers. (R. 527).
The Company's President also testified that in the
negotiation of a franchise the Company would have
something to say about the amount and would not agree
to pay an exorbitant charge. (R. 529). There is no
contradiction in the record.
Exhibit 23 (R. 222) prepared by the Company's
Auditor, Mr. Jones, was introduced in evidence (R. 666).
It shows that the total of all municipal levies as applied
to 1951 revenues was $178,423 of which $99,607 represented recent increases almost entirely attributable to
increased franchise fees payable under the newly negotiated long term franchise agr;eements with Ogden
and Salt Lake City. It also shows that the net increases,
after allowing an adjustment for decrease in income
taxes resulting from this additional expense, was only
$46,517. This amonnt obviously could have only a
:negligable affect on the overall rates. Other factors
compelled the application of an increase, as is clearly
6
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sho"·n by a comparison of this figun• with the figures
sho·wn by the Company·~ comparatiYe income statement,
Exhibit 16, (R. 196) "·hich shows, for example, an increase of allowable operating reYenue deductions of
$~,98:2, 197 for the yt>ar ending· ~larch 31, 1952, over the
year ending December 31, 1949.
The matter being submitted, the Commission on
July 29, 1952, made and entered its Report, Findings
and Order ( R. 15-30). · Section 9 of the Report deals
with the problem here under consideration. (R. 2425 ). It reads:
The applicant's expenses for the year 1951
include franchise taxes charged by Salt Lake
City, Ogden, Sandy City, and South Salt Lake.
These franchise taxes are imposed at the rate of
two per cent of the gross receipts for electricity
sold within the corporate limits in Salt Lake
City, Ogden, and Sandy City, and one per cent
of the sales in South Salt Lake. Based upon
1951 sales the amount of the franchise tax in the
four cities referred to is $178,423. The position
of the applicant is that such tax expenses should
be included by it in its overall expenses, and in
turn, should be charged against all rate payers
in the State. The Commission is of the opinion
that such method of charging the tax is unfair
to the rate payer residing outside of the cities
imposing such taxes, and would eneourage all
cities served by applicant to levy as high a franchise tax as is possible and require rate payers
who are not residents of the particular city to
help pay the taxes for the upkeep of such eity.
The commission is of the further opinion that it
is better public policy to have the citizens and
rate payers conscious of all taxes being levied
The Commission
by the local municipalities.

7
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finds, therefore, that such taxes should be filed
separately and charged against the rate payers
of the municipalities which levy such taxes. This
Commission has previously adopted a similar
policy in former hearings before it concerning
both the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Mountain Fuel Supply
Company. 4/ Nothing was introduced into the
present case which would cause the Commission
to change its policy as to the method of charging
and collecting such taxes. It will follow that in
the event any city lowers or removes these city
levies, electric rates will be reduced accordingly
within that city.
In Section 10 of the Report (R. 25-27) the Commission considered in detail the effect upon net return
of various changes in operating expense which had
occurred or which would take place as a result of the
Commission's order. One of these factors was the
decrease in operating expense resulting from the transfer of the charge for franchise fees from the Company
to its customers in the franchise cities. The Commission
(R. 27) says:
The other adjustments heretofore discussed,
and their effect upon the Utah operating income
for 1951 may be summarized as follows:
Decrease in Federal
energy tax
$334,116
Adjustment for franchise taxes
- 178,423 $512,539
(Note: Handled as a decrease)
Increase in wages
$207,260
Increase in purchased power 178,192 387,452
Net adjustment (decrease in expenses ) $127,087
4/ Re: The Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., I & S Docket No. 83
Decided May 5, 1952;
:Re: Mountain F'uel Supply Company, Case No. 3755
Decided April 30, 1952

8
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A decrease of $127,087 in operating Pxpenses
would increase the Federal income tax by 52 per
cent of such amount, or $66,085. There would
be a net increase of $61,002, therefore, in the
operating income of $4,980,156, changing such
figure to $5,0-!1,158.
It is notable that the Commission handled this
item as a decrease in expense and not as an increase in
the local rates.
The finding· and order excludes the Franchise taxes
both from the revenues and from the expenses of the
Company.
The franchise taxes are no longer recovered as a part
of the charges made for electrical service, and then
paid out as a Company expense; they are collected from
the consumers within the franchise cities as a separate
tax item, and then turned over to the cities without
affecting either revenue or expense accounts on the
Company's books. The Company bas become, as to
these taxes, a mere collection agent for the cities, and
the burden of the tax is shifted from the Company to
its customers in the franchise cities.
That this is in compliance with the intention of the
Commission is made clear by the Commission's approval
(R. 32) of the New Rate Schedules (Exhibit 40, R. 838896) filed pursuant to the Findings and Order. These
approved rate schedules make no provision whatsoever
9
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for the recovery of the taxes as a part of the electrical
service charges. The taxes are treated as an extraneous
collateral item, not as a part of the electric service rates.
The Commission having, upon the findings quoted,
made the Order complained of, Ogden City in due time
served and filed its petition for a rehearing (R. 34-42).
On August 27, 1952, the Commission denied the
petition (R. 43), whereupon this
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1. The order of the Commission is beyond
the Commission's jurisdiction, power and authority.
Point 2. There is no evidence to support the material findings of Section 9 of the Commission's Report
and Findings of Fact.
Point 3. The report and findings of the Commission do not support its order.
Point 4. The order of the Commission impairs the
obligation of the company's franchise contract with the
city and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, Section
10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States
and Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah.
Point 5. The order of the Commission, by authorizing a specific and arbitrary setoff, releases and extinguishes at least in part the indebtedness, liability
and obligation of the company to the city under its
franchise contract in violation of Article VI, Sections
27 and 29 of the Constitution of Utah.

10
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Point 6. The order of the Commission unlawfully
attempts to exercise power to superYise and interfere
with municipal money and property and to levy municipal taxes and perform municipal functions which cannot lawfully be granted the Commission under Article
VI, Section 29 and Artie le XII, Section 8 of the constitution of Utah.
Point 7. The order of the Commission unlawfully
transforms a lawful and proper franchise fee exacted
from the company into an unlawful tax on the purchase
or use of electrical power in violation of Article VI,
Section 29, Article XI, Section 5 (a) and Article XIII,
Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah.
Point 8. The only case approving the passing on
of a franchise fee is distinguishable. The other cases
support the city's position.
ARGU11ENT
General Considerations
This case represents the culmination of a policy
with respect to the imposition of the burden of municipal
franchise fees and license taxes which the Commission
apparently resolved upon some time in 1951. As the
Commission said in its findings,
''This Commission bas previously adopted
a similar policy in former hearings before it concerning both the Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company and the Mountain Fuel
Supply Company.''

11
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By a footnote to its findings (R. 25) the Commission
referred to its decision re, the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, I & S Docket No. 83,
decided May 5, 1952, which is now pending before this
Court on certiorari, and its opinion re, Mountain Fuel
Supply Company, Case No. 3755, decided April 30, 1952.
It is interesting to note the development and progress of the Commission's policy and theory with respect
to municipal taxation and franchise contract fees. In
the ~iountain Fuel Supply Company case the Commission authorized the utility to "pass on" to the consumer
within the municipalities all municipal license taxes and
franchise fees imposed after the entry of the order. No
attempt was made to disturb existing franchise contracts. In the ~iountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company case the Commission granted the
utility's application for authority to pass on these
taxes and fees to consumers within the municipality,
including those paid pursuant to the obligation of existing franchise contracts. In the case now before the
Court the Commission has taken the last step : It has,
against the protest and over the objection of the utility,
required the utility to pass on to its consumers within
the municipalities in question all municipal franchise
fees and license taxes under existing as well as future
contracts.
It must at the offset be observed that there is no
specific statutory authority and it is admitted that there
can he no statutory authority for such action by the
Commission. The Commission has set itself up as a
policy establishing body for the state with respect to
the handling of municipal taxes on public utilities.
12
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Only threr rourts of last resort have had occasion
to consider the question of "·hether a public service
commission may properly authorize a public utility
to pass on its municipal franchise fees and license taxes
to the consumers within the municipalities concerned.
The eases are :
City of Elmhurst YS. Western United Gas
Company
(Illinois, 1936)
1 Northeastern 2nd 144 ;
State vs. Department of Public Service
(Washington, 1943)
142 Pac. 2nd 498, 532, 536, Syllabi 44-45;
and
State vs. Public Service Commission
(Missouri, 1952)
245 S. W. 2nd 851.
The :Missouri case last above cited is the only case
clearly and definitely in point here and it was there that
the order of the Commission directing the municipal
levies in question to be passed on to the consumers within the respective municipalities was void
In the Washington case the Supreme Court of that
state distinguished between franchise fees and license
taxes and held that the Commission could not order the
franchise fees passed on to the consumers within the
franchise cities, but approved the order of the Commission in so far as it authorized license taxes to be
passed on. The fact is, as will be hereinafter demonstrated, the case at Bar is stronger than either the
Washington case or the Missouri case as regards franchise fees and the Washington case is distinguishable
from the case at Bar in so far as it affects license taxes.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
13administered by the Utah State Library.
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The Elmhurst case from Illinois approved an order
directing franchise fees and license taxes to be passed
on, but it is clearly distinguishable upon the facts from
the case at Bar and many objections are here raised
that were not there urged. We expect to demonstrate
in this brief that on reason and authority the order of
the Commission below in this case is unlawful and void.
POINT 1. The order of the Commission is beyond
the Commission's jurisdiction, power and authority.
The Commission has boldly and openly usurped
the policy making prerogatives of the Legislature. It
recognized that it was fixing and detrmining policy.
In its report (R. 25) the Commission said:
'' The Commission is of the further opinion
that it is better public policy to have the citizens
and taxpayers conscious of all taxes being levied
by the local municipalities. The Commission
finds, therefore, that such taxes should be billed
separately and charged against the rate payers
of the municipalities which levy such taxes.''
(Emphasis supplied)
The Commission obviously did not inadvertently
drift into policy making while it was concerned with
rate making. It has with its eyes open declared that it
is fixing policy for the State of Utah.
It must be observed that no such policy as the Commission seeks to establish has ever before been recognized in the State of Utah. On the contrary under the
provisions of Article XIII, Section 5 and Article XII,
Section 8 of the Constitution of Utah and the statutes
enacted by the Legislature thereunder the matters of

14
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municipal taxation and the granting of municipal franchises to electrical power utilities have been considered
entirely within the prerogatiYe of the Legislature of
the state and of the legislati,·e bodies of the municipalities, to whom the people and the Legislature have
in part delegated their legislatiYe and policy making
powers in this regard. The policy which has been uniformally established and followed since statehood has
been that municipal franchise fees and license taxes
should be considered as a general expense of the utility
to whom they were levied and should be paid out of their
general funds and not passed on to their consumers as
a separate tax item on their bills. The Commission, as
shown by the record here, has heretofore recognized
and followed that established policy. The Legislature
bas met many times with full knowledge of the policy
that has been pursued and has never seen fit to pass
any law changing the established policy. It therefore
must be presumed to have approved that policy. Under
the Constitution and Laws of Utah the cities have authority to grant franchises to utilities and to impose
conditions. Clearly the determination of the amount of
a city franchises fee, or of a city occupation tax, and
of the person upon whom the burden thereof shall be
imposed, is a matter of municipal policy. In fixing
such policy the local authorities are not subject to control, direct or indirect, of the Commission. They are
controlled only by general law and the Constitution.
Matters of public policy are not for the Commission.
Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public
Service Commission 103 Utah 186, 200203, 134 Pae. 2nd 469;

15
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Idaho Power Company vs. Thompson 19
Federal 2nd 54 7, 580.
As we have indicated, Ogden's franchise with the
company is clearly established as one in the nature of
a fifty year contract leasing to the company the privilege of using the city's public streets and alleys for
pole lines, transmission cables, ete., in the prosecution
of the company's private business which it very properly conducts for private profit. This is a privilege
which no private person or corporation may enjoy as
of right. It may be enjoyed only upon special grant
from the sovereign in U tab, the sovereign people. These
concepts are fundamental, and in accord with the authorities generally. See
Utah Light and Traction Company vs.
Public Service Commission
101 Utah 99, 118 Pac. 2nd 683, 689.
23 Am. J ur. ''Franchises,'' §§ 2 to 8, pp.
714 to 720; and
37 C. J. S. "Franchises," §§ 1 to 14, pp. 141
to 158.
In Utah, the people have delegated to the local authorities the exclusive right to grant this privilege to
electric companies as to city streets, and have specifically forbidden the legislature to grant any such right
without the consent of local authority. The sovereign
people, in Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution
of Utah, have declared that
"No law shall be passed granting the right
to construct and operate a . . . . . telephone or
electric light plant within any city .... without
16
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the con~ent of the Lwa1 authorities who have
control of the street or highway proposed to be
occupied for such purposes.''
This court has held that, eYen assuming that this
constitutional provision has no application to interurban railroads, a muicipality clearly has the right to
grant or lcithhold the right to the use of the streets
therein, and thus to impose conditions respecting the
'llSe thereof for purposes other thau the right of ordinary
travel thereon.
Shortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co.,
52 t:tah 476, 488; 174 Pae. 860.
The Legislature has, perhaps superfluously, implemented this right granted cities by the Constitution.

In
Section 10-8-14, U. C. A., 1953,
(Section 15-8-14, U. C. A., 1943),
it has provided that
"They (the City Commission) may construct,
maintain and operate .... electric light works ..
. . or authorize the construction, maintenance
and operation of the same by others . . . . . "
And in
Section 10-8-13, U. S. A., 1953,
(Section 15-8-13, U. C. A., 1943),
it has provided that
''They may regulate the. . . . . use of streets

"
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In the ease of
1_Tnion Pac. R. Company vs. Public Service
Commission,
103 Utah 186; 134 Pac. 2nd 469
(Syllabi 7, 8 and 9),
this Court held that, under the constitutional and statutory grants of power to cities, a city may impose terms
and conditions upon its grant of a franchise, and revoke the franchise for breach thereof. It further held
that, although the provisions of a franchise agreement
with respect to rates are subordinate to the Commission's exclusive control of rates, in all other matters
respecting franchise for the special use of city streets
the city's powers and rights are not in any way subject
to the cotrol of the Commission. The Court commented
that inasmuch as it construed the Public Utilities Act
as not granting the Commission any jurisdiction over
city street franchises, no question is presented of delegation of municipal functions to a special commission
in violation of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution
That section provides that,
"The Legislature shall not relegate to any
special commission.... any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal .... money,
property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, .... or to perform any
municipal functions.''
It is clear that the establishment of public policy
with respect to franchises to use city streets is a municipal function vested by the Constitution anl laws of
Utah in the legislative authority of the municipalities,
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and the Commissil)n in attempting to overrule and reverse the policy established by the legisativc authority
is exceeding its jurisdiction and power and its order is
void.
It is equally clear that, in using Og·den 's streets and
the streets of her sister cities, the Company is enjoying
a special privilege which it could not enjoy except by
consent of and arrangement \Yith the local representatives of the inhabitants. These streets have been opened,
improved and maintained by the inhabitants, either by
special assessment levied on the abutting property owners or by general tax levy on all property owners within
the corporate limits. The streets belong to the cities'
inhabitants. In using the streets for electric power lines,
the company imposes thereon a special burden, and enjoys a special privilege which no other inhabitant or
taxpayer enjoys. It is only proper that it should compensate the inhabitants for suffering tba.t burden and
granting that privilege.

That is a very proper policy firmly established by
the Constitution and statutes of Utah. It bas been
recognized by the decisions of this Court above cited.
Moreover, by Article XIII, Section 5 of the Constitution the Legislature is forbidden to levy any city, town
or other municipal tax, but is authorized to vest such
power in the local authorities. By Article VI, Section
29, above referred to, the Legislature is forbidden to
authorize any special commission to levy any such tax.
Pursuant to these provisions of the Constitution the
Legislature has authorized cities to license and tax all
businesses. Thus, by the Constitution and laws of the

19
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state power to establish public policy with respect to
license taxes on business conducted within municipalities is clearly vested in the municipal authorities and
not in the public service commission. The right to establish policy in this regard obviously includes the right
to establish as a policy the identity of the taxpayer upon
whom the burden of the tax, as a tax, shall be imposed.
The local authorities (in this case the South Salt Lake
City Commission) have asserted that power and determined the policy. The taxes are payable by the company, according to the ordinance, and the commission has
power or authority to transfer the burden of that tax
in violation of the policy established pursuant to the
Constitution and Statutes of Utah.
The order of the Commission clearly is contrary to
established public policy in Utah and attempts to establish a policy exactly contrary to the one already fixed
and recognized. This is clearly beyond the jurisdiction
of the Commission and its order in this regard is void
and should be set aside by the Court.
Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 544-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Section 76-4-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943) prescribing the powers of the
Commission to regulate rates, regulations, practices,
etc., of utilities, the Commission has power to order or
authorize a change in a practice or rate only when substantial evidence is presented to prove and the Commission finds that the existing practices or rates are inherently ''unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential'," or in violation of law.
20
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In the case of
~fountain

States Telephone and Telegraph
Company Ys. Public Service Commission
105 Utah 230; 142 Pac. 2nd 873,
rehearing denied, 105 Utah 266, 271; 145
Pac. 2nd 790, 792,
this court held that an order adjusting rates of a public
utility is invalid unless based on evidence, "calculated
to show that existing intrastate rates were inherently
unreasonable.''
The proponents of any change
in existing rates or pr3;ctices must prove this jurisdictional fact. In the absence of proof of this jurisdictional
fact the Commission has no jurisdiction to order a
change in the existing practice, and the order is outside
the authority of the Commission and void.
The order in this case should be set aside as void
and beyond the jurisdiction and authority of the Commission which entered it.
POINT 2. There is no evidence to support material
findings of Section 9 of the Commission's report and
findings of fact.
Throughout that portion of the hearing in which
the question of franchise fees and license taxes was under
consideration, the Commission assumed that the payment of varying franchise fees and license taxes as general expenses of the company was "unfair" to the rate
payers residing outside the cities in question. Assuming, without conceding, that such an "unfairness"
rendered the practice "unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential,'' as required by the statute,
21
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still there is no evidence in the record to prove that assumption as a fact, and it remains a bald and unsupported assumption.
Indeed all of the evidence in the record is to the
effect that the treatment of the franchise fees as a
general expense payable out of the genral revenues
of the company is fair and just and tends properly and
equitably to distribute the burden among all of the rate
payers. It will be recalled that Mr. Gadsby's testimony (and it was the only testimony before the Commission) was to the effect that while rates in and out
of the franchise granting cities were identical, in genral
the costs of serving the consumers within the franchise
granting cities were materially less, and, furthermore,
the license to do business in the larger, more thickly
populated urban areas contributed to the financial stability of the company to such an extent that it could
borrow money a.t more favorable rates, and that these
benefits were reflected in the rates throughout the
system, so that the company's franchises and licenses
to do business in these urban areas in fact resulted in
a substantial benefit to the consumers outside the municipalities. As he said, he did not know whether this
benefit amounted to 2% or 5%, hut it was something.
The payment of the franchise fees and license taxes to
these larger municipalities is obviously a fair and reasonable adjusting factor in this case, and the existing
practice of paying these fees out of the general funds
of the company as a general expense is not unfair.
It must be observed, however, that clearly the burden of proving the facts which would grant the Commission jurisdiction to order a change in the existing
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practice "·as on the Commission which on its own motion proposed the rhangt>. EYen if the evidence had
not been contrary to the finding, the finding is base~
on several assumptions, none of which find any support
in the evidence. Let us consider them in turn.
First, it was assumed that the payment of the franchise fees, taxes, etc., out of the general funds of the
company creates a difference in the burden of electric
power rates. This, of course, is entirely unfounded.
As the evidence shows, the rates of the company throughout the state are absolutely identical for identical service. The company has a ''postage stamp'' type of rate.
Second, the Commission assumed, contrary to the
evidence, that the consumers outside the franchise cities
received no benefits from the payment of the franchise
fees, etc., by the company, but that consumers within
the frachise municipalities receive the benefit of these
taxes when expended by the city. This assumption
again is directly in the face of the only evidence before
the Comission and contrary to reason. It must again
be recalled that ~Ir. Gadsby, the President of the company, testified that the ability of the company to do business in these urban localities enabled the company
to give power to the consumers outside these cities at
rates lower than it could otherwise have done and that
therefore the outside consumers benefited thereby to
the extent of 2 ~ or perhaps even 5% of their electric
power bills. The Commission obviously looked at the
wrong side of the problem and considered only the
benefits accruig from the expenditure of tax moneys
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by the city, and not to the benefits to the rate payers
which the payment of these taxes by the company purchase for them.
In this connection it perhaps should be observed
that in our urban civilization it is becoming increasingly
evident that city dwellers are already paying a disproportionate share of the tax load. There are many examples, but perhaps one will serve. City property
owners pay county taxes to build rural roads as well as
city taxes to pay for city roads. But the people outside of the cities pay no city taxes to build city roads
upon which the power company may locate its power
transmission lines.
What the Commission is here attempting amounts
to local rate making rather than state-wide rate making and it proposes to base the local variations upon
one item of expense, to-wit, the franchise fees and license taxes, and to make the cost of power vary with
these changes. In so doing it made its third assumption which is entirely without basis in fact and is contrary to the evidence. It assumed that all other expenses of renderilng electric power throughout the state
were equal and that these municipal charges, by which
(as it further assumed) the city consumer alone benefited, created the only inequality. ,\
/

The evidence is exactly to the contrary. Namely,
that it is cheaper to serve consumers within the cities
where these levies are made and that for this reason,
if there is any unfairness, the unfairness operates
against the cosumer within the cities in question. The
estimate of the Company's President was that the dif24
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ference was so great, that it resulted in a rate benefit
to the outside subscribers of from 2% to 5%, although
he had no definite figures to submit. The highest franchise is 2%. At the most, even if the Commission's
other assumptions could be supported, the franchise
fees could only offset the pre-existing unfairness against
the consumers within the cities.
The Commission obviously forced· the shoe on the
wrong foot. If any rate differentials should be made,
the people in the large urban centers should have the
more favorable rates because, as the testimony shows,
it cost less to serve them.
We have found only one case in which a court of
last resort has had occasion to review and pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a claim that
franchise fees discriminate against rural consumers.
However, the facts there are so nearly identical to the
facts in this case and the reasoning there adopted by
the very learned and able Supreme Court of Missouri
is so applicable and so cogent that we cannot forebear
to examine and quote from it at some length. We believe
it will be very helpful to the court and we submit. the
principles there declared are controlling here.
That case is
State vs. Public Service Commission
(Missouri, 1952)
245 S. W. 2nd 851.
There a privately owned utility, the St. Louis
County Water Company, supplied water to sixty-six
incorporated and numerous unincorporated areas in St.
Louis County, 1fissouri. There, as here, the rates had
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always been fixed on a system-wide "postage stamp"
basis. Some sixteen of the incorporated areas levied
special taxes upon the gross receipts of the company.
Conceiving that these rates resulted in discrimination
against consumers in non-taxing areas, the Missouri
Public Service Commission there, as here, approved
a new schedule of rates which there, as here, made no
change in the basic rates, but added an amount equal
to the gross receipt taxes to the bills of consumers within the taxing municipalities. The Commission found
that it was ''an unjust discrimination for the water
consumers of one area to be burdened with any part of
the taxes levied or payments exacted by another area,''
and ''that the consumers in any and all municipalities
which seek to obtain revenue from such taxes or payments should bear the burden of providing such
revenue.'' The Commission there, as here, ordered that
all the municipal exactions, "whether in the nature of
license taxes, occupation taxes, street rentals, franchise payments'' or otherwise, should be paid by consumers within the municipality receiving the same.
In two aspects there is a difference between that
case and the case at Bar, but in each instance the
position taken by the Utah Commission is more patently
erroneous and arbitrary than that taken by the Missouri
Commission. The first difference is that the Missouri
Commission held that the recovery of the municipal
charges should be made "in the rates themselves" rather
than by adding the same to the bill as a separate item,
as was done by the U tab Commission. As we will point
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out later in thit' brief, we belieYl' this alone would inYalidate the action of the Utah Commission as being
an interference \Yith the taxing power.
In the second place, in the )lissouri case there was
no direct testimony that tlle consumers outside the
taxing cities receiYed a benefit from the privileges of
doing business, and of using the streets, etc., which the
company receiYed in return for the payment of the
taxes, while in the case at Bar there is direct and
positive testimony that the expenses of the company
are less "\\-rithin the municipalities in question and that
the outside consumers benefit thereby to the extent of
2% to 5% of the cost to them of electric power. In this
regard it is obvious that the cities' case before this
Court stands upon a stronger foundation than did the
cities' case before the Missouri Court.
The ~Iissouri Court in that case observed that the
Commission might have resorted to local rate making
and classified the cities and towns and fixed rates on
a unit basis, but that the company there was organized
and operated on a system-wide basis, and all its properties, "irrespective of the conglomerate political
subdivisions in its system, have been valued, and both
rates and the right to a fair return have been determined
upon that basis.'' That is equally true here .

. =-

The Missouri Court declared,
'' . . . . all taxes, including taxes on gross
receipts, are a part of operating expense, . . . .
and no doubt were and may be taken into consideration by the Company when it becomes
necessary to determine or redetermine rates or
a fair return.
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.... But regardless of the respective merits
of the two methods of operation, the Company
operates on the system-wide basis, and the Commission has heretofore approved its rates and
return on that basis, and both are now in the
anomalous position of disregarding the system
basis and treating this one item of operating
expense upon a segregated, municipal unit basis."
(Emphasis supplied.)
This is also true in the case at Bar.
The Court then examined the facts and the record
to determine whether or not the payments to the municipalities did in fact result in discrimination. Attempting
to prove disparity, the Company had submitted the
following:
1. Charts showing gross revenue per customer,
and ranking the cities levying the tax;
2. Charts ranking the tax levying cities by gross
revenue per mile; and

3. Charts ranking the tax levying areas with respect to revenue received from such areas as compared
to taxes paid.
The Commission found that in 24 of the 66 cities
served, about 75% of the revenue came from the taxing
cities. But there were no charts~ showing total gross
receipts, or net income, nor any d&fnonstration that there
was any impairment of the Company's fair return in
the areas levying the tax.
Obviously in the Missouri case a greater effort was
made to prove discrimination than was made in the
case before this Court, and the effort there failed. It
should fail here. The :Missouri Court there says:
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••The Order and the Company'~ position
erroneously prPsnppose that there was no discrimination in the former uniform rates in the
first place and, of coure, that assumption is without foundation . . . . . 1t certainly costs the
Company less to serYe some areas than it does
others, and necessaril~· there is a corresponding
discrimination inherent in uniform rates throughout the system. In the areas that are less costly
to serye there is undoubtedly a greater profit to
the Company than in the more costly areas and
that results in discrimination in rates in favor
of the costly areas. If any of the municipalities
levying the tax are in the less costly areas, the
addition of the tax to their water rates obviously
increases the burden of the discrimination. There
is no data in this record from which precise information may be obtained, but for the most
part the cities levying the tax are the greatest
in density of population and contribute the
greater sums to both the Company's gross and
net revenue. Those areas in which the Company
has a franchise or valuable contract rights certainly make the greater contribution to the
Company's stability and successful operation.
From an operational standpoint they are in a
more favorable position for rate making purposes
than some isolated, unincorporated area, or some
other more costly area, and yet uniform rates
ignore these disparities. In short, there is a
disparity in the former uniform system wide
rates and the discrimination is favorable, undoubtedly, to the more costly areas, and the
taxes involved in this proceeding :may or may not
shift that unfavorable disparity; from all tha.t
appears in this record the taxes may have equalized the previously existing inequalities. But if
it does, it does not necessarily follow that the
29
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amount of the resulting difference is precisely
the amount of the tax, or that it exceeds the more
favorable rate previously enjoyed by the more
costly operational areas or, in short, that the discrimination is unfair and unjust.
''There is no reasonable basis upon this record for the Commission's finding and order;
accordingly the judgment is reversed." (Emphasis added.)
The case is obviously and exactly in point, and supports completely the position of the City herein.
Moreover it is in c.omplete harmony with the principles
established by our Utah Statutes and by this Court in
the case of
Mountain States Tel. and ,_rel Company vs.
Public Service Commission, 105 Utah
230, 142 Pac. 2nd 873; Rehearing denied,
105 Utah 266, 145 Pac. 2nd 790,
holding that a Commission order purporting to equalize
rates is invalid unless based on ''evidence calculated
. rates were inherently
to show that existing . .
unreasonable. ' '
The assumption that the assumed difference in
burden is unfair to the rate payer outside the franchise
cities is unjustified, and against the law and the evidence.
The Commission made a third entirely unjustified
assumption when it undertook to adjust the burden of
the power company rate payers by passing on the franchise fees and license taxes to the consumers within
the city limits. It assumed that the assumed difference
in burden. was exactly equal to the amount of the fee or
tax in each municipality involved. This is obvious from
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the fact that the Commission purported to correct this
unfairness by its order authorizing the exact amount
of the tax to be passed on in the cities where imposed.
It made no attempt to inquire as to possible compensating factors, and indeed it ignored the positive
evidence before it that there definitely were compensating factors which, if anything, made the existing rate
system unfair to i:he city consumers. It made no attempt to inquire as to possible other compensating
factors such as variations in labor cost, in ad valorem
taxes, in building rentals or in easements for pole
lines ad cables It made no inquiry as to whether or
not there was in the several areas relative equality of
return in proportion to the capital investment in property used in serving such areas.
This presumption just assumes the impossible. If
rates are to be adjusted on a community level, evidence
must be taken to establish a reasonable basis for the
adjustment to be made in each community, and specific
findings made for each community fixing the amount
a.nd the direction of each adjustment.
Finally the Commission assumed that there was
no reasonable basis for the assumed difference in
burden. It is, of course, recognized that differences in
cost of service, in capital invested in rendering service,
in service rendered and in operating conditions justify
a difference in rate. If differences in operating conditions, costs, etc. differ, then the rates also must differ
and an exactly compensated, equal rate is unreasonable.
Such was the rule established by this Court in M oun.ta.in
States Telephone and Trle,qraph Company vs. Public
Service Cnmm1"ssion, supra. Unless there is evidence to
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show that a difference in burden is unreasonable, the
Commission has no authority to attempt a correction.
Here there was absolutely no evidence to show that the
difference, if any exists, was unreasonable, but on the
contrary the only evidence before the Commission
showed clearly that the handling of the franchise fees
and license taxes as a general expense of the company
payable out of its general revenues was a fair, just and
reasonable practice which did substantial justice as
among all of the rate payers. As the order here is not
based on any evidence showing that the present practices are unreasonable, it must fall under the authority
of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company case, supra.
It is clear from a consideration of the principles
considered in the Missouri case, supra, and of the
evidence in this case that the Commission cannot fairly
and justly make local rate differentials solely with
regard to the cost of franchise fees or occupation taxes.
We do not believe they can be "a little bit pregnant"
with local rate making and still comply with the law.
If rate structure must be re-examined on a local basis,
as the Commission has here attempted, then the only
fair and just method, and we submit the only legal
method, is to re-examine all structures of rate making
on a local basis upon the same principles as the same
are now examined upon a system-wide basis. We do
not advocate this, but as we say, it is impossible to make
local differentials that will be fair unless all factors
affecting the costs of power to the consumer are considered in establishing such differentials.,

32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At any rate the Commission's present order directing these municipal charges to be passed on to consumers within the municipalities is not based on any
evidence and it must be vacated.

POIXT 3. The report and findings of the Commission do not support its order.
As hereinbefore indicated, under the provisions of
Section 5±-4--!, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (formerly
76--1--1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943), the Commission has
no authority or jurisdiction to order a change in an
existing rate practice unless it shall first find that the
practice is ''unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or
preferential,'' or in violation of law. The only finding
made in this regard \Yas that "the Commission is of the
'opinion' that such method of charging the tax is' unfair'
to the rate payer residing outside the cities imposing·
such taxes, and would encourage all cities served by
applicant to levy as high a franchise tax as possible
..... '' The Commission has nowhere found as a fact
that the existing practice is unjust, unreasonable, dis·criminatory, preferential or in violation of law. It has
only stated an arbitrary opinion that the practice is
unfair.
It is obvious that this opinion as to the unfairness
is not a finding as a fact that the rates are unjust within the meaning and intent of the statute.
If such
"Unfairness" were to be held "unjust" as a matter of
law, then it must follow that the payment as a general
expense of local office rentals, ad valorem city taxes
levied on property located within the cities, and the
cost of obtaining private easements for power lines
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would also be unjust, and it would be necessary in order
to establish a lawful rate, to pass on all of these expenses
pro rata to the persons residing within the particular
area. This is obviously not what the Legislature had
in mind, for expenses of all kinds inevitably vary from
place to place and the Legislature had in mind only
equal rates for equal service and did not intend to grant
the Commission power to order local expeses passed
on as a separate item to local consumers and this create
a veritable chaos in the already complicated matter of
fixing rates for public utilities.
There are in law many inequalities which must be
countenanced because their correction would so complicate society that society could not bear the burden
of the bureaucratic regulation of every item. It is submitted that the finding made by the Commission does
not bring this case within the perview of the statute
and the order is unsupported by any finding required
by the statute and must be vacated.
POINT 4. The order of the Commission impairs
the obliga.tion of the company's franchise contract with
the city and its inhabitants in violation of Article I,
Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United
States and Article I, Se.ction 18 of the Constitution of
Utah.
It is apparent from what has been said before that
the order of the Commission impairs the obligation of
the Company upon its franchise contract made by Ogden
City for the benefit of its inhabitants, the real parties
in interest. It is therefore unconstitutional and void.
34
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~"

\Y e apprehend that Jwre ns in the telephone case
now pending before this Court the Commission will
raise two points in attempted answer:

First, that the obligation of the franchise contract
was not impaired, and second, that a city cannot claim
the protection of these provisions of the national and
state constitutions. It is submitted that neither answer
has any validity here.
In the first place it is here obvious that the city's
inhabitants are the real parties in interest; the contract
for the payment of a franchise fee was for their benefit.
The franchise fees are intended to be expended by their
representatives in furnishing them those municipal services for which cities are organized. Let us consider
whether or not the order has impaired this obligation
or has deprived them of benefits.
Before the Order, the Company paid their representatives, out of its own funds, the amount of the franchise fee, and it was expended by their public servants
for their account and benefit. After the Order, it is
true, the franchise fee will still be paid to the public
servants of the inhabitants, to be expended for their
benefit, but the obligation to make that payment has
been lifted from the obligor Company and saddled upon
the obligee inhabitants. The obligee has been forced to
assume the obligation; the inhabitants have become both
obligee and obligor; and the Company, formerly the
obligor, has been relieved of all obligation except to act
as agent to gather the franchise fee from the available
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inhabitants and deliver it to their servants for expenditure. The obligation of the Company has been whittled
down from that of a debtor owing rentals for a special
street privilege, to that of a mere collecting agent.
It is as if the maker of a note were to be authorized
to say to the payee, ''Of course I'll pay you-but only
when and if I have extracted the wherewithall from
your own pocketbook.''
It is idle to say that the obligation is not impaired.
The entire essence and benefit thereof has been
destroyed.

A recognition of this practical result, which the
Commission obviously intended and whi~h indeed is
part and parcel of the new public policy which the Commission is sponsoring, is implicit in the opinion of the
Commission (R. 25) "that it is better public policy to
have the citizens and rate payers conscious of all taxes
being levied by the local municipalities. The Commission finds therefore that such taxes should be hilled
separately and charged against the rate payers of the
municipalities which levy such taxes.'' Obviously the
citizens will not be "conscious of all taxes" unless they
bear the burden thereof, and it is, of course, the express
purpose and intent of the Commission that these citizens,
formerly the beneficiaries of the tax, should now hear
the burden thereof. It is utterly idle to contend that
when a beneficiary has been converted into a burden
carrier that there is no impairment of an obligation to
furnish him with a benefit.
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If it be arg-ed that the obligation runs to the municipal corporation, and not to the citizen-inhabitant
stockholders, and that the obligation to the corporation
bas not been impaired, the answer is three-fold. First,
it is obYious that the corporation and its officers (the
"public servants") in this case acted for and represented its inhabitants who are the real parties in interest,
and, under the American rule, the third party beneficiary
is recognized as the legal obligee. Second, no matter
who is recognized as the obligee, the obligation of the
Company is impaired. The City is entitled to look to
its original obligor, and cannot be compelled to accept
a novation with neu: obligors who will, as the Commission anticipates, immediately bring pressure and agitate
for the cancellation of the obligation. Third, it is the
established law of this state, and elsewhere, that ''a
corporate entity may be entirely disregarded in order to
reach and protect the real parties in interest, and to
disclose the real transaction.''
Western Securities Co. vs. Spiro 62 Utah
623, 221 Pac. 856, Syllabus 5.
See also
18 C. J. S. ''Corporations,'' section 6, pp.
376-377,
where it is said that:
''It is clear that a corporation is in fact a
collection of individuals, and that the idea of the
corporation as a legal entity or person apart
from its member is a mere fiction of the law introduced for convenenience in conducting the
business in this privileged way. It is now well
settled, as a general doctrine, that, when this
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fiction is urged to an intent not within its reason
and purpose, it should be disregarded and the
corporation considered as an aggregation of persons, both in equity and at law .... The Courts
will disregard the corporate fiction whenever
its retention would produce injustices and inequitable consequences.''
See also
62

c.

J.

s.,

pp. 68-69,

where it is said that a municipal corporation may, and
frequently does act as agent for its citizens, and is regarded as a trustee for its inhabitants.
If ever there was a case where the corporate entity
should be disregarded in the interests of justice, this
is that case. The inhabitants of Ogden stand in grave
danger of being unjustly deprived of the fruits of their
grant of franchise privileges by the subterfuge of paying through their corporation, with their money, a debt
beneficially owned by them. The corporate entity of
their municipal corporation must not be permitted to
stand between them and justice.
The Company's obligation to the City's inhabitants
is impaired by the Commission's order.
As to the second objection raised by the Company
to this point, we readily concede that it is general rule
that Municipal Corporations cannot claim, as against
the state, the protection of the ''impairment of abligations '' clauses. There are two clear replies by way of
which the City avoids this admitted rule.
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The first ha~ alr~ady hren ~uggested. 'l.,he real
parties in interest here are the individual power consuming inhabitant~ of Ogden, in whose behalf the City
here appears. Th~y are under no such disability. When
the corporate fiction of the city is disregarded, as it
must be here in the interest of justice, and the representative function of the city is recognized, the citizens of
the city stand before the court unencumbered to claim
their constitutional rights. The city claims these rights
in their behalf, and with their support. Off the record,
it is interesting to note that a number of rate payers in
Ogden City have refused to pay the tax, thus putting
the company in a most embarrassing position. It is
also interesting to note, off the record, that Ogden City
is now being billed as a consumer for a part of the
franchise fee which the company is to pay to the City.
Such is the anomalous position into which the Commission's order has forced the company against its will.
And who with reason could say that when the city itself
is billed for the franchise fee, that the obligation of the
company to pay that fee to the city has not been im
paired 1 Here is an exact and direct setoff and cancellation of the debt.
The second reply is that the rule is based upon
considerations which have no application in Utah to
these facts. The reason behind the rule is that municipal corporations are regarded as mere creatures of
the state, whose very existence depends upon the whim
of the state legislature which created them, and which
can deprive them of any right, as it can deprive them
of existence.
39
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But that situation does not obtain in Utah, and
especially in the case of Ogden City. In Utah under
Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislature cannot interfere with the City's franchise power.
It might repeal the general laws under all cities (except
Ogden) exist (Constitution, Article XI, Section 5 ), but
so long as it allows them to exist as municipal corporations it cannot infringe their rights under the Constitution to grant or withhold power company franchises,
and impose conditions respecting the same. Only the
people can do that, by constitutional amendment, and
they have not acted. Only the Commission, the creature
of the legislature has attempted to act, and it is elementary that the legislature cannot delegate to a commission, its creature, powers which it does not itself have.
See
16 C. J. S., pp. 344, note 61;
339, note 14 (3); and 342, note 41.
See also
City of Columbus v. Public Utilities Commission (Ohio, 1921) 133 N. E. 800,
syllabi 26 to 31,
holding that the legislature cannot delegate to the Public
Utilities Commission power to nullify a City's franchise
contract in violation of the Federal prohibition against
impairing contract obligations.
Furthermore, franchise negotiations under Article
XII, Section 8, are clearly municipal functions which
the Utah legislature is specifically prohibited from delegating to any commission by the provisions of
40
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Article VI, Sertion 29, of the Com,titutioll
of Utah.
rrhis court held in
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Public
Service Commission,
103 Utah 186, 200-203
134 Pac. 2nd 469,
that a city's power to grant franchises, and impose conditions, is exclusive, and that no order of the Commission can reach or affect a city's rule made thereunder.
It did not apply, however, the Constitutional prohibition; it held that the Legislature had not attempted
to violate the restriction, and that the Commission is
without statutory authority to regulate the terms of
franchise contracts. The payment of the franchise fee
by the Company, not the city's citizen beneficiaries, and
the rendering of free service without direct charge to
the citizen beneficiaries, are important and material
conditions properly imposed by Ogden City upon the
granting of the Franchise. The regulation of those conditions is a city function, entirely beyond the scope of
the Commission's authority. The Commission cannot,
under the pretense of exercising its rate making power,
meddle in exclusively city affairs.
Furthermore, since Ogden in 1951 adopted the
"Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City" pursuant to
the Constitution, Article XI, Section 5, it is no longer
deP.endent on the legislature for its corporate existence.
It can no longer be abolished, or its rights impaired by
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any act of the legislature or its creatures. The reason
for a city's disqualification to claim constitutional protection against the legislature no longer applies to Ogden
City.
It is apparent that in Utah the Legislature has no
power to meddle in Ogden's franchise contract, and can
delegate no such power to the Commission. Therefore
there is no reason why the City is not free, with respect
to such contract, to claim the protection of the Constitutional prohibitions against impairing the obligations
of contracts.
Perhaps it should be added that the rate making
power, under the guise and pretense of which the Commission proceeded here is a legislative function, covered
by the constitutional restriction.
43 Am. Jur. "Pub. Util."
Section 83, p. 624-625.
But it must be noted that what the Commission was
actually trying to do, under this guise and pretense, was
to regulate city franchise contracts. That will be demonstrated later in this brief. But that is obviously
still a legislative function.
The Order is void because it impairs the obligation
of the Company's franchise contract with the City.
POINT 5. The order of the Commission, by aruthor·
izing a. specific and arbitrary setoff, releases and ex·
tinguishes at least in part the indebtedness, liability and
obligation of the company to the city under its franchise contract in violation of Articile VI, Sections 27
and 29 of the Constitution of Utah.
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Article VT, Sertion :21, of the U tab Constitution
provides that
''The Legislature shall have no power to
release or extinguish, in whole or in part, the
indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation or person ..... to any municipal corporation..... "
Section 29 provides that
''The Legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission . . . . any power to make,
supervise, or interfere with any municipal . . . .
money, property, or effects, whether held in trust
or otherwise, to levy taxes . . . or to perform
any municipal functions.''
Here is a special protection for contract obligations
owing to the city, if any is needed. Clearly, neither the
legislature, nor (a fortiori) its creature, the Commission, may release the obligation to Ogden of the Company's City franchise contract.
Yet that is exactly what the Commission has attempted to do, as has been above demonstrated. lt has
attempted to release the Company from obligation to the
city and to impose in lieu thereof a new obligation upon
Ogden City electric power consumers-including the
city, for it uses more electiric power than the "free service" affords.
The case of
St. George v. Public Utilities Commission
63 Utah 43, 220 Pac. 720,
is not in point. The contract there was not a franchise
contract, protected also by Article XII, Section 8, but
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was a contract for the sale of a municipal power plant for
which the consideration, in part at least, was a agreement
to furnish "free" city power for a term. There the Commission ordered that the city be charged the regular
power rates, but fixed and allowed as a credit against
these power charges the value of the purchasing compa.ny' s obligation to furnish ''free'' service for the term.
Thus the form, and not the substance of the obligation
was affected, and the Court approved, but even then
Justice Gideon doubted the properiety of approving a
"re-writing" of the City's sale contract.
Here the exact reverse is true-the substance, and
not the form of the obligation is affected. Here the Order
of the Commission would absolutely cancel the Company's obligation, without providing any real compensatory benefit to the city and its inhabitants. It clearly
violates the Constitutional prohibitions.
POINT 6. The order of the Commission unlawfully attempts to exercise power to supervise and interfere with municipal money and property atnd to levy
municipal functions which cannot lawfttlly be granted
the Commission under Articile VI, Section 29 and Article
XII, Section 8 of the Constitution of Utah.
The order of the Commission as above demonstrated
completely rewrites the franchise contract in its substance and effect. It changes the nature of the obligation from that of debtor to that of collection agent. It
effects a novation by which the city's inhabitants who
use electric power would be substituted as obligors in
the place of the Company. This goes far beyond any
mere change in form. A contract to grant a franchise
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in return for serYice as the "collector" of a power use
tax is quite a differet thing from a contract to grant a
franchi~e in return for an annual payment by the Company of 2% of its gros~ receipts from local sales of electricity. There are obvious and cogent reasons why the
latter is much more beneficial to the city and to its inhabitants, and much to be preferred when negotiating a
contract. The change is a very material change in the
contract.
Clearly the determinition of the consideration for
and the conditions under which a franchise is to be
granted are matteers of municipal policy. Clearly the
determination of the amount of a city occupation tax
and of the person upon whom the burden thereof shall
be imposed, is a matter of municipal policy. Under the
provisions of Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution it can be exercised only by the municipal authorities. Neither function can under the Constitution he
exercised either by the Legislature or by its creature,
the Commission. The provisions of the Constitution
of U tab, Article XII, Section 8, Article XIII, Section
5 and Article VI, Section 29, forbid the Legislature or
its Commission to meddle in these local affairs. The
people framed our Constitution with unusual and farsighted wisdom apparently anticipated the growth of
state as well as Federal bureaucracies and took precautions to protect local government of the people against
its encroachments.
As above demonstrated under Point 1 of this brief
matters of public policy and particularly matters of
municipal policy are not for the Commission.
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The fixing of the City's franchise terms and conditions, as has been attempted by the Commission here,
is purely and solely a municipal function entirely beyond the scope of the Commission's power. It is a function which the Legislature under the constitutional provisions referred to could not, even if it would, delegate
to the Commission. We submit that the Legislature
has not attempted so to do.
Again this "rewriting" of the franchise contracts,
and this release of the company's obligation to the city
and its inhabitants is an obvious and intolerable interference with the city's "municipal money, property and
effects.'' It is a void attempt to exercise a power which
the Legislature has not and could not delegate to the
Commission and it is unconstitutional and void.
That there may be no question, we call attention to
the fact that in the case of
Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commission
72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961,
this Court held that Article VI, Section 29 of the Constitution applies to the Commission here.
Again we must refer to the case of
Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public
Service Commission
103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. 2nd 469,
in which this Court held that under the provisions of
Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution the granting
of a franchise and the imposition of condition precedent
to the making of such grant are municipal functions
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·with which the Commis~ion has and enn haY<: no concern. This deeision clearly brings the case at Bar
squarely within the prohibition of A rtic·le VI, Section
29. The Commission in this case is assuming to exercise authority which the Constitution forbids it to have.
For these reasons also the Order of the Commission must be vacted.
POINT 7. The order of the Commission unlawfully
transforms a lawful and proper franchise fee exacted
from the company into an unlawful tax on the purchase
or use of electrical power in violation of Article VI,
Section 29, Article XI, Section 5(a) and .Article XIII,
Section 5 of 'the Constitution of Utah.
In considering this point we must first direct the
Court's attention spec.ifically to the exact provisions
of the order of the Commission. The Commission directed that the Company ''shall state on customer's
bill and collect as a separate item ..... from its customers in any municipality wherein is imposed any municipay franchise . . . . . or licese tax. '' It must also be
noted that the Commission's findings (R. 25) are,
''That such taxes should be billed separately
and charged against the rate pa.yers of the municipalities which levy such taxes.''
This is made ever more abundantly clear by the
Commission's findings (R. 27) with respect to adjustments in which it made the adjustment for franchise
taxes by elimiatin.g them as an expense item. If more
was needed to make the intention of the Commission
absolutely clear, we need only to refer to Exhibit 40
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(R. 838 to 896) approved by the Commission (R. 32) in
which no provision is made for the collection of these
taxes as revenues from the sale of power.
Thus the Commission has made it clear that the
tax money to be collected by the Company under its
order is neither revenue nor expense and that it is not
and cannot be considered as a charge for power service rendered. The new schedules prescribe all of the
charges to be made for power furnished and they do
not include any part of the tax. On the contrary the
tax is collected-as a tax-as a separate item. It is
clear then that the Commission here has not even attempted to disguise its action under the pretense of
rate fixing, but has baldly ordered into effect its theory
of public policy with respect to municipal franchise
fees and license taxes. It will be remembered that
the Missouri Commission at least had the grace to make
a pretense that it was fixing rates, but our own Commission has not thought it necessary to make even a
pretense of confining itself within the limits of its
authority. It has levied the Power Company license
taxes and franchise fees directly upon the consumers
as taxes and as franchise fees.
It is noteworthy th~t the Commission is concerned
with mechanisms to control city taxes and franchise fees
and not with rate making. It will be recalled that the
Commission declared that the present method "would
encourage all cities served by applicant to levy as
high a franchise tax as is possible . . . . '' Note also
that the Commission states that it is of the opinion "that
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it is better public policy to haYP the citizens and rate
payers conscwns of t1ll ta."\:es being· levied by the local
municipalities.·'
Obviously and clearly the Commission is concerning itself not with rates which are its province, but with
municipal taxes which are forbidden to it by the Constitution.
'rhe effect of the order is that it cancels the franchise and license taxes and levies in lieu thereof a city
electric power sales or use tax on city subscribers.
This clearly is in excess of the powers permitted
by the Constitution to the Legislature or its delegatee
Commission.
By Article XIII, Section 5, of the Constitution the
legislature is forbidden to levy any city, town or other
municipal tax, but is authorized to vest power in the
local authorities. So far it has never seen fit to vest
the local authorities with power to levy sales, purchase
or use taxes on the sale or purchase of any commodity
or service. The Commission has rushed in where the
local authorities themselves cannot tax.
And Article VI, Section 29, forbids the legislature
to delegate to the Commission the power to levy any
taxes-but that has not restrained the Comission from
the attempt.
Ogden, as a charter city, derives its power to tax
directly from Article XI, Section 5 (a) of the Constitution-but here also the power granted is the "'power
49
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prescribed by general law," and we know of no provision graning any municipality the right to levy a tax
of the kind here attempted.
We have found only one other case where this
problem was involved. It is the Washington case of
State vs. Department of Public Service
142 Pac. 498, 535.
The court makes no attempt to analyze the practical result, but merely declares that
''There is no basis for the argument advanced by the cities that the department is seeking to exercise the taxing power, or to interfere
with the exercise of that power by the cities. The
only question concerns the allocation of the moneys paid by respondent to the cities under a taxing ordinance or pursuant to franchise provisionR

"
Nor does it appear from that decision that there
the Order in question ''passed on'' the tax as tax, as
was attempted here. On the contrary that Order merely
increased rates for service in an amount sufficient to
compensate the Company for its cost in municipal ta~es
in each city. The case is therefore distinguishable on
this point. The court says,
''We are of the opinion that the Department,
insofar as such taxes are concerned, has the power
to fix special excharnge rates . . . which will in
effect requires the rate payers in each community
to absorb a sum equal to the amount of the tax
..... More than this the department cannot do."
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The case was· remanded for further proceedings. It
would seem that the court was authorizing a bona fide
fixing of rates on a local, rather than on a state wide
basis, and presumably the department in its further
proceedings would take evidence on all the factors necessary to fix fair rates on a local rather than state-wide
basis. The case is not in point on the question of the
effect of '• passing on'' the tax as an exercise of tax
power by the Commission.
No matter what may have been the fact as to the
nature of the action taken by the Washington State
Commission which was the subject of the decision of the
W ashingion Court, in this case it is very clear that the
Utah Commission has here attempted to levy a tax, as a
tax upon the consumers of electrical power, and this
it cannot do.
In this connection, off the record, it is interestmg to note that the Federal Government has refused
to pay this 2% tax on power delivered for its use within the cities in question upon the ground that the Federal Government is not subject to any tax by any state
or local authority. Again it must be observed that the
Commission has saddled the Company with an unwanted and impossible task.
Inasmuch as the order of the Commission is an
unauthorized and unlawful attempt to exercise taxing
power and unlawful attempt to exercise taxing power
and to interfere with the exercise of the taxing power
by the authorities vested therewith it is void and must
be set aside.
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POINT 8. The only case approviJng the pass1ng
on. of a franchise fee is distinguishable. __ The other
cases support the city's position.
As we have before stated, there are only three
cases by courts of last resort which consider the problem
created by an order of a public service commission requiring a utility to ''pass on'' municipal franchise fees
and license taxes.
The first case to be decided was the Illinois case of
City of Elmhurst vs. Western United Gas
Company (Ill., 1936)
1 Northwestern 2nd 144.
That case involved a schedule of rates filed by the defendant utility which had general application throughout the utility's northern district except as to five
municipalities. In those cities the company was authorized to add to its uniform charges for gas service
a ''percentage differential sufficient to meet the
annual payments which the Company is required to pay
each of the five municipalities" by virtue of the franchise ordinances. The City of Elmhurst asked to have
this differential eliminated.
The Illinois Statute
generally prohibited unreasonable differences as to rates
as between localities and forbids discrimination. It
further empowered the commission to consider one or
more nvunicipalities as a regional unit, either with or
without the adjacent or intervening rura.Z territory
and in such unit to prescribe uniform rates for customers
of the same class. The Illinois Court held that under
this statute, the commission did not act unlawfully in
classifying the franchise municipalities as separate units
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and making differentials equal to the differences
in franchise fees. This is a situation quite different
from the situation in the rase at Bar, for here we have
no statute authorizing the isolation of a single city as
a rate unit, but our statute requires rates to be fair
and uniform throughout the state for equal service.
:Jioreover, in the Illinoi8 case the court observed
that ''no question is raised as to the fairness or uniformity of the basic rate in the territory served." In this
case the only evidence before the commission, which is
certainly in accord with reason and general knowledge,
is that the expenses incident to serving the franchise
cities are less, and if any rate differential is to be established, the inhabitants of these cities are entitled to the
benefit of this lower cost. In this case the positive
testimony is that if various areas are to be segregated
and considered separately, the company's customers
outside the franchise and taxing cities benefit at the
expense of the customers within those cities. Thus it
is apparent that the facts before this court differ
materially from the facts before the Illinois Court, and
arguments based upon these factual differences are
pressed here which were not pressed upon the Illinois
Court.
Again, in the Illinois case the Court remarks that
the city alone receives the advantage of the annual
payment of a franchise fees. That is a fact entirely
contrary to the evidence in the case at Bar, for here
the evidence is that the privilege of doing business in
the franchise and taxing cities results in a material
financial benefit to the customers of the company outside the city limits.
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The Illinois ease is for these reasons distinguishable
from the case at Bar and does not support the ruling
of the Utah Commission. If it were not distinguishable,
it is submitted that it is wrong on reason and should
not be followed.
It should also be commented that the Illinois Court
states badly, without any analysis or consideration of
the problem, that the order of the Illinois Commission
did not interfere with the franchise contract, and that
the order of the commission did not contravene the
constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts. We are not advised upon what arguments and
considerations the Illinois Court based this conclusion. Certainly the court's failure to carefully consider
the problem and outline the basis for its conclusion
lessens the respect to which the opinion would otherwise
be entitled. However, here again the Illinois case is
distinguishable on this point, because as the court will
have observed, the Illinois Commission merely authorized an increase in some of the city consumers rates
sufficient to raise the amount necessary to pay the
franchise tax. It did not pass on the tax as a tax to
the consumer and thus relieve the utility ·of any obligation to pay the tax. Under the Illinois ruling the
commission would still have to receive the differential
as income from charges for service and would have to
show the payment of the tax as an expense. Under the
Utah Commission's order that is not the case. The
Company in Utah will no longer pay the tax itself but
will act as a collecting agent from the consumers. This
is obviously a differenee in substance and not merely in
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form. Here again it i~ submitted that if the Illinois
case is not distinguishable on the facts, then it would
be wrong in principle and should not be followed.
The second
considered is

case

in which

this problem

was

State YS. Department of Public Service
(Washington, 1943,)
142 Pac. 2nd 498, 532, 536 (Syllabi 42
to 45'.
In that case the Supreme Court of Washington had
under consideration an order of the Washington Department of Public Service approving rate schedules for a
telephone utility by which the rates in municipalities
were made to vary sufficiently to permit the company
to recover within each municipality the amount of franchise fees charged by each city for the use of its streets
and the amount of license or occupation taxes. The
court there held that the Department of Public service
lacked legal authority to direct or permit the telephone
company to pass franchise fee payments along to rate
payers within the respective franchise granting cities.
It pointed out that franchise fees were payments made
for benefits received and that a franchise is in the
nature of a contract. It pointed out that taxes on the
other hand are exactions made by the government under
governmental authority for the purpose of defraying
governmental costs and expenses. The Washington
Court concluded that the Department of Public Service
there, insofar as occupation taxes were concerned, had
the power to fix special exchange rates applicable to the
different communities, which would in effect require the
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rate payers in each community ''to absorb a sum equal
to the amount of the tax which respondent is required
to pay to that municipality. More than this the department cannot do.'' This ruling was based upon an assumption apparently made by the Washington Court
and Department for the court said,
"Manifestly there is an element of unjust
discrimination in allowing one community to levy
and collect from respondent or any public utility
engaged in business throughout the state an
occupation tax which in turn the utility would
colle-ct by a state-wide increase in rates.''
r:rhe evidence in this case negatives this point made
by the Washington Court, because the evidence here
is that urban areas are cheaper to serve and give a
financial benefit to the rural areas which franchise fees
or business license taxes tend to equalize. In the case
at Bar the franchise taxes are then an equalizing factor
rathe,r than a factor creating unjust discrimination. The case at Bar, as to license taxes, is distinguishable on the facts from the Washington case.
The Washington case then clearly is authority in
support of the position of plaintiff in the case at Bar
as to franchise fees, and is distinguishable with respect
to the license tax levied by South Salt Lake. It is
interesting to note that the Washington Court both criticized and distinguished the Elmhurst case insofar as
it applied to franchise fees.
We have already distinguished the Washington
case insofar as it bears on the question of interfer56
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enee by the Commission with the taxing and franchise
granting powers and prerogatives of the municipal
authorites.
The third case which has been previously decided
by courts of last resort is, of course, the ·Missouri case of
State YS. Public Service Commission
(Missouri, 1952)
2-!5 S. W. 2nd 851.
This case we have previously discussed 1n detail. It
is plainly exactly in point here and in favor of the
position of the plaintiff city both as to franchise fees
and as to license taxes.
It thus appears that as to the authorities considering
this question the only cases which have reached a result,
contrary to the one here con tended for, are distinguishable and other authority supports the plaintiff's position.
On the authorities considered the order of the commission should be vacated and set aside.

CONCLUSION
This case and the companion case of Ogden City
vs. Public Service Commission, No. 7884, recently argued
and submitted to the court are, we believe, of great and
paramount importance. The issues involved are much
larger than the mere question of who shall ultimately
bear the burden of a franchise fee or license tax. Indeed
that minor question is one which never can be solved
ultimately, because as a matter of fact each person who
pays that tax must in turn pass it on in his charges for
goods or labor to the persons he served who in turn must
pass it on again. And the circle in a civilized community is endless.
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The paramount question at stake here is the question
of local self-governmet. In this case the Commission has
challenged the very constitutional foundations of local
self-government which is so characteristic of our American civilization. This challenge should be thrown back.
It is respectfully submitted that on reason and on
authority the Commission below acted illegally, arbitrarily and capriciously, and in excess of its jurisdiction
in entering the order requiring the company to pass on
the tax to its consumers within the franchise and
taxing cities, and that order should be vacated.

Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
JACK A. RICHARDS
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
CHARLES A. SNEDDON
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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